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ABSTRACT 
Since August 2008, the newly commissioned Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) has been 
trained for SWO qualification through the INTRO/ASAT program.  Through this 
program, USNA and NROTC officers check onto their first ship and subsequently attend 
a five-week introductory course given by the Afloat Training Group (ATG) located in 
one of the Fleet Concentration Areas, and OCS officers attend the course in Newport, RI.  
Following this training, they report to their ship for on-the-job training (OJT).  Computer-
Based Training (CBT) discs are available to use as references.  About 17 months 
following commissioning, the officer then reports to Surface Warfare Officer School 
(SWOS) for three weeks of Advanced Shiphandling and Tactics (ASAT) training.  Upon 
arrival at ASAT, the officer is administered the SWO Fundamentals exam, designed to 
measure knowledge and retention of information covered during the OJT period.  This 
thesis analyzes the SWO Fundamentals exam scores from 2007 to 2010 to determine 
which demographic and background variables affect a student’s success and failure rates 
on the exam.  Significant differences were found in gender, race, commissioning source, 
ship type, homeport, and class year. 
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The Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) training pipeline has undergone several 
changes in the past decade.  In 2003, the 16-week Surface Warfare Officer School 
Division Officer Course (SWOSDOC) program changed to Surface Warfare Officer 
School (SWOS)-at-Sea, which then changed in 2008 to the current INTRO/Advanced 
Ship-handling and Tactics (ASAT) program.  Through each shift, there was a constant 
emphasis on training to the needs of the Navy by finding a balance between minimizing 
the length of training and time spent away from the fleet and maximizing the level of 
relevant information retained.  This study will attempt to aid in the estimation of that 
balance for the current course of instruction (COI) by identifying which students are 
more likely to have difficulties meeting tested standards during the period between 
commissioning and ASAT.    
A. BACKGROUND 
From 1970 to 2002, SWOS conducted SWOSDOC, a COI designed to imbue 
prospective SWO Division Officers with the requisite knowledge to begin working 
onboard Navy ships. This COI consisted of focused classroom instruction at SWOS in 
Newport, RI at the start of each officer’s commissioned service, lasting six months at the 
start of the curriculum and shrinking to 16 weeks at its close.  Following SWOSDOC, the 
officer went to their first ship for further training and SWO qualification.  In 2003, 
SWOSDOC was dissolved and replaced with SWOS-at-Sea, an On-the-Job Training 
(OJT) program using Computer Based Training (CBT) reference and evaluation discs.  In 
this COI, the officer reported directly to their ship following commissioning, and 
commenced duties as a Division Officer while learning the required SWO knowledge 
from mentors and CBT discs. At approximately 16 months, after completing the CBT 
discs, attaining the required SWO pre-requisite qualifications (to include Combat 
Information Center Watch Officer and Officer of the Deck Underway) and upon their 
Commanding Officer’s recommendation, the student then attended a month of leveling 
instruction at ASAT in SWOS.  
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In August 2008, the Surface Warfare community shifted from the SWOS-at-Sea 
program to a hybrid approach between the division officer COI and the OJT method, 
INTRO/ASAT.  This new approach consists of a five-week SWOS Introduction course, 
which takes place in the officer’s Fleet Concentration Areas (FCAs) for USNA and 
NROTC commissioned officers and in Newport, RI for OCS commissioned officers. 
Following INTRO, they report to their ships for a 12–16 month on-the-job-training (OJT) 
period where they learn their trade and perform duties as Division Officers.  Once each 
officer demonstrates an acceptable level of SWO knowledge, their respective 
Commanding Officers send them to the three-week ASAT course at Newport, RI for 
knowledge refinement and leveling. Once the student has completed the COI at ASAT, 
they return to their ship for further training and SWO qualification.  
Since 2006, during the first two days of ASAT, SWOS instructors have 
administered the SWO Fundamentals exam, which measures the student’s understanding 
of the requisite basic SWO knowledge attained during the period between commissioning 
and ASAT. This study analyzes the scores from the SWO Fundamentals exam from 
2007-2010 and each student’s demographic, professional and pre-commissioning 
attributes and will determine which attributes significantly impact the student’s exam 
scores. The results of this analysis will highlight any particular subset of students having 
difficulties meeting tested standards within the training pipeline prior to reaching ASAT. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to answer the following questions: 
-How are a student’s pre-commissioning factors, such as demographics, 
commissioning source, college quality, and major, related to their SWO 
Fundamental exam scores? 
-How are a student’s professional factors, such as homeport, ship type and 
department related to their SWO Fundamental exam scores? 
-How are students in the INTRO/ASAT pipeline performing on the SWO 
Fundamental exam compared to students from the SWOS-at-Sea pipeline? 
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C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  This first chapter introduces the 
background and focus of the study.  Chapter II provides further detail on the current 
SWO Training pipeline as well as all literature relevant to the current study.  Chapter III 
describes the data used for this study and discusses the methodology of the analysis 
conducted.  Chapter IV discusses the results of the analysis in detail.  Finally, Chapter V 
summarizes this study, provides several conclusions based upon its results, and lists 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background for each Junior Officer 
Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) training curriculum, review previous analyses into the 
effectiveness of those curricula and review studies relevant to the variables used in 
previous SWO training evaluations.  This chapter presents those studies as the foundation 
for the analysis and results of the present research.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. SWOSDOC   
At its close in 2003, Surface Warfare Officers Division Officer Course 
(SWOSDOC) was delivered by traditional classroom instruction at Surface Warfare 
Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, RI.  Having begun as a six-month course and 
eventually scaled down to 16 weeks, the course prepared newly commissioned officers to 
learn the fundamentals of shipboard life and operational requirements.  Officers were sent 
on permanent change of station (PCS) orders from their respective commissioning source 
to Newport, and from there, to their first ship.  Once on their ship, they would use the 
skills and knowledge they had attained at SWOSDOC as a starting point from which to 
work for and subsequently attain their SWO qualification.  
2. SWOS-AT-SEA 
SWOSDOC was questioned in the late 1990s from officers such as Lieutenant 
Commander Davis in 1997, and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Poole in 1998, for failing to 
teach its students the knowledge actually required for shipboard performance, and for 
being a “program that is probably irretrievably broken” (Davis, 1997).  They stated 
several concerns, namely that officers could never learn how to drive a ship by sitting in a 
classroom, and that they were not receiving adequate training on any other topic as the 
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instructors did not take the training seriously, teaching “hour-long classes in 20 minutes 
or less” (Poole, 1998). To answer concerns such as these, VADM LaFleur, then 
Commander, Naval Surface Force, charged that officers go directly to sea from their 
commissioning source, stating that the ship would provide the necessary subject-matter 
experts for the newly commissioned officers and would allow them to progress through 
their qualification pipeline more rapidly.  Thus, in January 2003, the Navy adopted the 
SWOS-at-Sea program, where newly commissioned officers transitioned from their 
commissioning source to their first ship to receive approximately 16 months of on-the-job 
training (OJT) aided by a set of Computer Based Training (CBT) disks. They were 
expected to conduct their daily duties onboard and augment their learning with the CBT, 
which included a series of tests for each segment.  Following attainment of Officer of the 
Deck Underway (OOD U/W) and upon their Commanding Officer’s (COs) approval, 
they would then travel Temporary Duty (TDY) to SWOS for three weeks of classroom-
based knowledge refinement and leveling.  Subsequently, they traveled back to their 
respective ships to study for and attain their SWO qualification. 
3. INTRO/ASAT 
In a “Personal For” message to his Fleet Admirals, Admiral DC Curtis, then 
Commander, Naval Surface Force, said that he had received Fleet feedback stating that a 
“large percentage of our newly reporting Ensigns are not adequately prepared to function 
as an effective division officer/watchstander when they report onboard for their initial 
assignment” (ADM Curtis, in an e-mail sent to his Fleet Admirals on June 4, 2008). He 
further states, “Focusing on back to basics, I think the foundation of our success will be 
formed by providing our Officers with the basic education required to adequately perform 
their jobs on their road to becoming professional and effective Surface Warfare Officers.” 
The program he would charge to “bring back the basics” would be the INTRO course, 
which commenced in August 2008. Modeled after a three-week leveling course for 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates currently held at SWOS, the INTRO program 
created for graduates of the United States Naval Academy (USNA) and Naval Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (NROTC) consists of three weeks of instructor-based classroom 
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and simulator instruction located in the students’ respective Fleet Concentration Areas 
(FCAs). The Afloat Training Group personnel in each of these FCAs deliver the 
instruction.  This three-week curriculum consists of 12 hours of Navy Familiarization, 23 
hours of Division Officer Administration and Leadership, 22 hours of Navigation and 
Seamanship, 19 hours of bridge simulator, nine hours of Maritime Warfare, 16 hours of 
Engineering/Damage Control/Supply and two hours of CBT familiarization. Further, 
USNA and NROTC students receive a fourth week of leadership training and a fifth week 
of ship visit and qualification work. The goal of this combined training is to provide the 
new SWOs the tools needed to commence OJT with a sufficient level of comprehension 
to better understand and retain the information they are receiving. 
Following this introductory course, all students return to their ship for OJT.  The 
current version of SWOS-at-Sea CBT, v3.0, is formatted with a curriculum designed to 
complement OJT progression.  Its course of instruction (COI) consists of the Personnel 
Qualification System (PQS) 100 Section (Fundamentals) and 200 Section (Systems) for 
all pre-requisite qualifications for the SWO PQS:  Basic Damage Control, Maintenance 
and Material Management (3M) Division Officer, OOD Inport, SWO Engineering, Small 
Boat Officer, Combat Information Center (CIC) Watch Officer and OOD Underway.  
Also, it contains modules for Shiphandling, Weather, MOBOARDS, Division Officer 
Administration, Message Writing, Navigation, Rules of the Road, OOD Inport, 
Communications, Underway Fundamentals, Engineering, Combat Systems and 
Training/Readiness.  All modules are incorporated with practicums, practical problems, 
assessments and case studies designed to help the student conceptualize the raw 
information received.  These CBT modules are available for reference, but are no longer 
required unless an individual CO requires them.   
At a time determined by the student’s CO based on pre-requisite SWO PQS 
qualification completion, and OJT progression (typically about 17 months), they will 
report to SWOS for the three-week Advanced Ship-handling and Tactics (ASAT) course, 
which is similar to the three-week SWOSDOC leveling course previously given under the 
SWOS-at-Sea program.  Once the students have completed their COI at ASAT, they 
return to their respective ships to study for and attain their SWO qualification. 
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The ASAT program consists of 13 hours of Administration and Testing, 18 hours 
of Conning Officer Virtual Environment (COVE), 23 hours of Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) and Navigation, Seamanship, Shiphandling (NSS), 51 hours of 
Maritime Warfare (MW) and 10 hours of Leadership training.  Throughout the training, 
the student will receive four tests: SWO Fundamentals, Rules of the Road (ROR), 
Navigation Fundamentals (NAV) and Maritime Warfare (MW).  The SWO Fundamentals 
exam assesses knowledge gained during the period between commissioning and ASAT, 
and the ROR, NAV and MW exams assess knowledge gained during ASAT instruction. 
Every student must pass the SWO Fundamentals exam by 75 percent or higher, the ROR 
exam by 90 percent or higher, the Navigation Fundamentals Assessment by 75 percent or 
higher and the MW exam by 75 percent or higher.  Officers who attain a minimum of 85 
percent on the SWO Fundamentals exam, a minimum of 96 percent on the ROR exam 
and a minimum of 85 percent on the MW exam are given Honor Graduate status; Honor 
Graduates receive a “tie-breaker” in second tour Division Officer slating boards. 
C. TRAINING REFINEMENT 
In an effort to adjust and overhaul entire training programs, there are many 
opportunities to overlook areas that are critical to training success.  The following three 
studies discuss those areas for each training program and determine which areas require 
focus in future iterations.   
1. SWOSDOC 
Vaas (2004), in his study of the overall effectiveness of the Surface Warfare 
Officer Division Officers Course (SWOSDOC), analyzed a sample of 3023 students 
ranging from years 1994 to 2000 to determine the learning differentials among students 
and discuss possible difficulties with shifting from instructor-led SWOSDOC to self-
paced CBT.  By dividing the test scores into specific training modules and conducting a 
univariate analysis, he found that all accession sources were equally providing officers 
with the leveling required to perform at similar paces. However, he also found that 
minorities, non-technical undergrad students, USNA graduates, and females did not 
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perform as well as others on the SWOSDOC tests.  These results showed that, while 
accession sources allow for minimal self-paced instruction concerns, it was dangerous to 
count on a CBT program to adequately train minorities, females, and non-technical 
undergrad students. 
This study’s results, particularly those highlighting the impacts of accession 
sources, gender and ethnicity will inform the analysis of the present thesis as it attempts 
to find and evaluate the specific hindrances to SWO education under the current 
curriculum. 
2. SWOS-at-Sea 
In “An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Computer-based Training for Newly 
Commissioned Surface Warfare Division Officers,” Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay 
(2009) discussed the overall effectiveness of the training program since the dissolution of 
SWOSDOC.  In six interviews with post-command Captains, they found an overall lack 
of standardization across the board for training implementation, an increasing shortage of 
knowledge in their Division Officers, a decreased perception of the value of SWO 
training among officers and a lack of shipboard mentorship amongst wardroom members.  
In interviews with 17 SWO CBT trainees, they found the following results: there was not 
enough time to complete the CBT, in addition to their normal duties; the students did not 
find CBT engaging or interesting enough to look at when they did have time; there were 
no training modules for interacting with and leading subordinates; and finally, USNA 
graduates are better prepared for shipboard life than OCS or NROTC graduates, resulting 
in a knowledge gap for application of the CBT modules.  As a result of this feedback, the 
researchers recommended a standardization of the entry training for SWOs to account for 
the observed deficiencies of computer-based training. 
For their statistical analysis, Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) conducted a 
multivariate regression for all exams (Maritime Warfare, Navigation, Seamanship, SWO 
Fundamentals and Rules of the Road).  The goal of this analysis was to determine what 
factors among demographics, military background and education background had an 
impact upon the knowledge level of students at SWOS.  They found that females, officers 
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assigned to non-CRUDES ships, those assigned to ships out of Norfolk and USNA 
graduates did not perform as well as others on the SWO Fundamentals exam taken at the 
beginning of the ASAT COI.  Conversely, there were no significant results regarding any 
gender inequity for the Maritime Warfare and Rules of the Road exams taken at the end 
of the COI following specific classroom instruction.  
In conclusion, Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) determined that further 
analysis needed to be conducted to determine the nature of the test-score differentials. 
This thesis compares these results to the current training program with a similar 
quantitative analysis. 
3. INTRO/ASAT 
In “Process Evaluation of SWOS Division Officer Training,” Crawford and 
Stoker (2010) sought to examine the efficacy of the new INTRO/ASAT Training 
program.  To assess the newly formed program, they conducted a formative evaluation 
including an interview process covering a sample of each stakeholder group.  In 
evaluating the INTRO course, they interviewed 110 officers, including those who had 
previously attended the new course, post-command and post-department head tour 
officers, Afloat Training Group (ATG) instructors, SWOS leadership and those currently 
attending the ASAT course.  Through the interviews, the researchers found that, with 
regard to INTRO, most students were happy with the opportunity to network with fellow 
Junior Officers outside of their respective wardrooms, and that they enjoyed the week of 
hands-on training at the close of the course.  However, they also found the following 
concerns:   
1. ATG is currently undermanned and is having difficulty fulfilling its many 
training missions, while also dedicating instructors to the INTRO course.  
2. The students feel as if they are receiving an inordinate amount of information 
in a short period, hampering the overall level of knowledge attained.  
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3. Students coming from USNA have already received most of the Division 
Officer Fundamentals information prior to graduating, and so are bored and disinterested 
when receiving the same information at INTRO.    
4. If a student has been on a ship for a longer period of time prior to reporting to 
INTRO, the information will already be known and will therefore be a waste of time. 
5. Senior Officers interviewed stated that there wasn’t enough focus placed on 
actual practical knowledge such as Material Maintenance Management (3M), standard 
commands, communications procedures and MOBOARDs, which they felt are the 
training material that forms the basis of SWO knowledge and thus consumes the bulk of 
the student’s OJT time.   
To assess the ASAT course, Crawford and Stoker (2010) interviewed 30 ensigns 
from an ASAT class.  Interviewees expressed generally positive impressions of the 
course, with the primary challenge noted being the extreme ranges of knowledge among 
the students when they arrive.   
For their quantitative analysis, Crawford and Stoker analyzed the test scores of all 
ASAT classes for 2009.  As the sample size is small, the results are not conclusive; 
however, as it spans both the old and the new program, it does serve to highlight potential 
trends in training deficiencies and provide focus for future training.  In an analysis using 
scores from the test battery as the dependent variables and student demographics and 
background as independent variables, they determined that students who underwent the 
new curriculum received lower test scores than those from the old curriculum.  Also, they 
found that women did not perform as well as men when tested for knowledge covered 
during their OJT period but perform at the same level when tested for knowledge covered 
during ASAT. Further, minorities were shown to perform lower on the ASAT test scores, 
but qualify sooner than Whites.  
These results show that there are several problem areas in the SWO training 
process, areas that need further research as a part of a similar analysis over a longer 
period.  The present study will provide such analysis. 
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Overall, Crawford and Stoker (2010) determined that the INTRO/ASAT 
curriculum satisfactorily answers the need for initial familiarization and socialization; 
however, the Navy will need to address the deficiencies found by the study (such as 
ATG’s manning concerns) in the near future in order to maintain surface training 
sustainability.  While addressing those deficiencies, the curriculum should be further 
adjusted to compensate for the noted training shortfalls in minorities and females, along 
with any other potential problem areas.  This thesis takes the known shortfalls from 
Crawford and Stoker’s quantitative analysis, evaluates them with a larger sample, and 
looks for all other differentials related to test failure and honor graduate performance in 
order to provide a complete picture for evaluating potential curriculum adjustments. 
D. TEST SCORE DIFFERENTIALS 
To effectively adjust a program’s training curriculum, the influencing factors 
behind the differentials affecting training must be completely understood.  To facilitate 
this further understanding, the following studies provide perspective relating to each 




As noted in Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) and Crawford and 
Stoker (2010), female SWOs do not perform as well as males when tested for knowledge 
covered during OJT/CBT periods. Many studies have addressed the differences in gender 
performance in the classroom environment, but are out of the scope of this thesis.  Any 
gender performance concerns raised by this analysis will be addressed in the 
recommendations portion of this study. 
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b. Ethnicity 
As noted in Crawford and Stoker (2010), minority officers do not score as 
highly on the SWO Fundamentals exam as white officers.  As with gender, there have 
been many studies that address the minority performance gap in education environments; 
however, also as with gender, these issues are out of the scope of this thesis.  Any 
ethnicity performance concerns raised by this analysis will be addressed in the 
recommendations portion of this study. 
2. Homeport 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) analyzed the effects of homeports on the 
student performance on the SWO Fundamentals exam by grouping the sample into four 
categories:  Western Pacific, Japan, Atlantic Coast and Other.  They found that those who 
were stationed on ships out of the Western Pacific, Japan and Other bases were 7.8 
percent, 12.6 percent and 32 percent, respectively, more likely to pass this test than those 
stationed on ships on the Atlantic Coast.  As a result of the model and controlled factors, 
possible reasons for the differences exclude ship type, self-selection from commissioning 
source or undergraduate institution quality or demographic differences.  As the analysis 
from the tests that measure knowledge gained under instruction at ASAT/SWOSDOC 
indicates, there are no significant differences among the students based upon homeport. 
The researchers suggest that possible reasoning for the differences in initial testing lies in 
some unknown factor related specifically to the students’ respective homeport itself.   
For the present research, the sample will be distributed to break out the results for 
the “Other” category in order to have a better understanding of the results.  As the 
Atlantic Coast bases are shown here to have a negative impact on student knowledge 
attainment and retention prior to attendance at ASAT/SWOSDOC, the present research 
will determine whether Norfolk or Mayport plays a predominant role in these results.  
In “You Only Get One Chance to Make a First Impression: A Quantitative 
Analysis of Division Officer Fleet Experiences on Surface Warfare Officer Retention,” 
Roy (2007) conducted a non-linear logistic regression on 3,206 SWOs in order to 
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determine the major causal factors in the “stay or go” decision.  His findings indicated 
that those officers initially assigned to ships stationed in the Norfolk/Little Creek areas 
were more likely to choose to stay in the Navy.  Roy suggested several possible reasons 
for this result, for example, the financial and residency stability of the region attracts a 
more grounded and long-term minded officer, one who would be more likely to stay in 
the Navy anyway.  Another explanation Roy suggested is that the more popular 
homeports, such as those on the West Coast, are taken by the more academically 
successful students; therefore, those left to choose Norfolk are those without as many 
external options for employment.   
According to Roy’s results, an officer’s decision to choose Norfolk as an initial 
homeport could be due either to his desire to perform well as an officer, or to his inability 
to perform during undergraduate school.  As such, the choice of Norfolk could be either a 
positive or negative indicator of his ability to learn the required material for SWO 
qualification. 
3. Ship Type 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) divided their sample of 551 SWOs at 
ASAT/SWOSDOC into four groups: Destroyers, Cruisers and Frigates, Amphibious 
ships and Other.  They found that officers assigned to Destroyers are more likely to pass 
the tests taken during the initial phase of ASAT/SWOSDOC, which measure self-directed 
study, namely the SWO Fundamentals exam, than those assigned to either Frigates or 
Amphibious ships.  Most strikingly, they found that those assigned to Cruisers and 
Destroyers (CRUDES) had a 20 to 30 percent higher passing rate than those assigned to 
Amphibious ships (AMPHIBS).  The researchers suggest that one possible reason for the 
difference in test scores is that officers on AMPHIBS have a lower level of personal 
motivation as their respective chains of commands include many officers from non-
surface warfare communities.  They pose that this factor could mean that AMPHIB 
officers experience less pressure to complete the CBT COI. 
Studying the difference in impact on SWO retention between the various ship 
types, Bautista (1996) in “Surface Warfare Junior Officer Separation: Does Ship Type 
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Make a Difference?” found that with a sample of 8260 officers ranging from years 1976 
to 1990, officers on CRUDES platforms were more likely to attain SWO qualification 
earlier than officers on AMPHIBS.  Specifically, he found that Division Officers on 
CRUDES had a more conducive environment for SWO qualification attainment and that 
Division Officers on AMPHIBS had a decreased likelihood of qualification regardless of 
undergraduate GPA. These results support Bellamy (1991), who conducted a similar 
analysis on SWOs past their initial minimum service requirements. Bellamy looked at the 
relationship between initial assignment, qualification and performance and found that 
certain ship classes, namely CRUDES ships, contribute to higher Junior Officer 
performance potential and faster qualification.  His conclusion states that CRUDES ships 
indeed offer the greatest opportunity for SWO qualification.  
These findings, namely that CRUDES platforms are more conducive to SWO 
qualification, and that officers on CRUDES platforms perform better on the SWO 
Fundamentals exam, will be used to determine the structure of the regression model for 
the present study and will be compared with its results for a more robust understanding of 
the effects of initial ship selection on SWO qualification.  
4. School Quality 
In an effort to determine the impact of the quality of an officer’s undergraduate 
education on their performance, Bowman and Mehay (2002), in “College Quality and 
Employee Job Performance: Evidence from Naval Officers,” conducted a study that 
included a sample of Naval Officers from over 1000 undergraduate sources.  Of this 
sample, Bowman and Mehay looked for the Fitness Report inclusion of the phrase 
“recommended for accelerated promotion” for those officers who had served less than 10 
years, and for promotion to LCDR for those who had served more than 10 years.  Taking 
these categories, they conducted a logit regression, using Barron’s educational institution 
classifications of Most Competitive, Highly Competitive, Competitive and Least 
Competitive and, controlling for GPA and major, found that graduates of Most 
Competitive and Highly Competitive institutions demonstrated a greater propensity to be 
“recommended for accelerated promotion” than their colleagues.  The researchers also 
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found that a technical degree was not necessary for success. Finally, they found that those 
with higher GPAs were indeed more likely to attain higher rank.  These results indicate 
most predominantly that the undergraduate source plays a role in the officer’s 
performance, with those who graduate from higher competitive institutions performing 
significantly better than their colleagues. 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) found surprisingly different results than 
were expected based on Bowman and Mehay (2002).  Of the sample of 372 officers, 
when compared with those from Mostly Competitive schools, only those from the Highly 
Competitive and Least Competitive schools were less likely to pass the CBT-measuring 
tests at ASAT/SWOSDOC.  Of the tests taken at the end of SWOS, however, there were 
no statistically significant predictors, indicating that the undergraduate school quality 
measurements may not be adequate measures of a student’s cognitive skills.   
As the sample size for Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) is relatively small, 
the present study will apply the same measurement variables over a larger sample, 
expecting results as predicted from Bowman and Mehay (2002), that those students from 
higher competitive undergraduate institutions will perform better than those from lower 
competitive undergraduate institutions. 
5. Undergraduate Majors 
In “College Quality and Employee Job Performance: Evidence from Naval 
Officers,” along with their results for college quality, Bowman and Mehay (2002) found 
that a technical undergraduate degree was not necessary for attainment of higher job 
performance marks.  They attributed this finding to job performance being a qualitative 
measurement tied more to interpersonal and social skills rather than to math and science 
skills.  However, Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) found the opposite for 
undergraduate degrees as they pertain specifically to CBT.  For their analysis, they 
categorized their sample into six major groups: engineering, math/physical sciences, 
biological sciences, business/economics, social sciences and arts and humanities; they 
found that those with technical majors outperformed all others on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam.  
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6. Commissioning Source 
In the three studies evaluating SWO training pipeline effectiveness, there have 
been three different results for the impact of accession points.   
Vaas (2004) found that the student’s accession point bears little impact on 
leveling performance at SWOSDOC.  However, on the initial tests, USNA graduates 
typically do not perform as well as others.  One possible reason for this, as discussed later 
by Crawford and Stoker (2010), is that there is less motivation to initially perform well in 
a military education environment after leaving such a similar strenuous experience as the 
Naval Academy. 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) determined that USNA graduates were 
better prepared to meet the dual challenges of shipboard duties and CBT requirements.  
They determined that SWOs who had graduated from USNA were acclimated to time-
restricted situations and would be more disciplined regarding self-instruction.   
Finally, Crawford and Stoker (2010) found that USNA students did not perform 
as well as NROTC and OCS graduates in the new INTRO curriculum.  One possible 
reason for the poor USNA performance at ASAT, as determined through the qualitative 
portion of Crawford and Stoker’s study, was that USNA graduates were less inclined 
towards the training, as they had already received similar instruction prior to 
commissioning, and that the graduates from the other two sources were perhaps hungrier 
for professional engagement, as they had received minimal such exposure prior to 
commissioning.   
The conclusions from these three studies show that there is an initial disadvantage 
to USNA graduates during the preliminary testing period, potentially due to the student 
having recently experienced advanced academic rigors that have affected his or her 
present motivation; however, this disadvantage has the potential to diminish throughout 
the training period.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
The curriculum and process for training SWOs has undergone several major 
upheavals during the past decade.  Throughout each change, the Navy has sought to 
directly answer the deficiencies of the previous program.  As there are many forces 
influencing the nature of knowledge attainment and retention for SWOs, it is important 
that the impact of each be understood and accounted for when making adjustments to the 
training curriculum; failure to do so would cause further upheaval and unneeded 





While the previous chapter provided the framework for the present study by 
discussing precedent studies and their relevance, this chapter discusses how that 
framework shapes the foundation for the analysis.  
B. DATA 
This study utilized Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) data containing 
student test scores, demographics, education and professional background from the SWO 
Fundamentals exam taken at the initial phase of ASAT/SWOSDOC during the period 
2007–2010.  In August 2008, SWOS-at-Sea transitioned to INTRO/ASAT, and the first 
class at ASAT under the new curriculum arrived 17 months after that, on average.  The 
SWO Fundamentals exam is given during the initial stage of ASAT and is designed to 
test the student’s knowledge gained during the period between commissioning and 
ASAT; it consists of four separate modules: Division Officer Fundamentals, Maritime 
Warfare, Rules of the Road and Engineering. This study will analyze the provided scores 
and student information for the SWO Fundamentals exam. 
C. VARIABLES 
The literature review shows that any SWO training analysis should include the 
following variables:  gender, ethnicity, commissioning source, undergraduate major, 
undergraduate institution quality, homeport, and ship type.  In order to show the effects 
of either CBT or INTRO/ASAT on the student’s test scores, the model will also include a 
variable for both types of curricula.  Table 1 outlines the proposed independent variables, 
and the percentage of each represented in the data set. 
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Table 1.   Variable Distribution∗ 
Dependent variables Percentage of Sample 
Failure 22.59 
HGE 39.77 
Independent Variables  
Gender  
  Male 75.12   
  Female 24.88   
Ethnicity  
  White 75.27   
  Black 8.12   
  Hispanic 4.79   
  Asian 5.93   
  Native American 0.57   
  Other 2.76   
Undergraduate School Quality  
  Most Competitive 7.91   
  Highly Competitive 13.53   
  Very Competitive 17.28   
  Competitive 14.57   
  Least Competitive 6.66   
Undergraduate Major  
  Engineering 18.12   
  Math/Science 13.95   
  Biological Science 8.43   
  Economics/Business 16.45   
  Social Sciences 31.70   
  Humanities 8.64   
  Other 1.41   
Commissioning Source  
  USNA 39.88   
  NROTC 40.92   
  OCS 19.26   
Homeport  
  Norfolk 29.88   
  San Diego 31.91   
  Everett 2.92   
  Mayport 11.19   
  Pearl Harbor 8.22   
  Sasebo/Little Creek 7.13   
  Ingleside/Pascagoula 1.98   
  Yokosuka 6.66   
Ship Type  
  DDG 38.05   
  CG 17.23   
  FFG 16.66   
  AMPHIB 25.35   
  MCM 2.76   
Department  
  Combat Systems 35.03   
  Engineering 28.79   
  Operations 31.96   
  Nav/Admin 3.28   
Class Year   
  2007 14.32   
  2008 27.23   
  2009 36.59   
  2010 21.92   
  
Number of Observations 1856 
                                                 
∗ Each variable group individually accounts for 100 percent of the sample, with the exception of 
Undergraduate School Quality, as USNA accounts for 39.88 percent as a Most Competitive institution. 
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1. Dependent Variables  
For this analysis, the SWO Fundamentals exam scores have been recoded into 
two separate dichotomous variables: Failure and Honor Graduate Eligibility (HGE).  
a. Failure 
In order to pass the SWO Fundamentals exam, a student is required to 
score 75 percent or above.  For the sample, 434 (22.59 percent) officers scored below 75 
percent on the exam.  The Failure variable is dichotomous where one represents any 
score less than 75 percent. 
b. Honor Graduate Eligibility 
During the ASAT phase, officers who attain a minimum of 85 percent on 
the SWO Fundamentals exam, a minimum of 96 percent on the ROR exam and a 
minimum of 85 percent on the MW exam are given Honor Graduate status. As such, for 
this study, the HGE variable will equal one for students who score 85 percent or above, 
representing Honor Graduate eligibility. 
2. Independent Variables  
a. Gender 
The gender variable in the data set is dichotomous, where male = 0 and 
female = 1.  Given the significant results from test-score analysis in Bowman, Crawford, 
and Mehay (2009), and Crawford and Stoker (2010), which suggested that females 
perform statistically lower on tests administered during the initial phase of SWOS/ASAT, 
the predicted influence of this variable on the propensity for failure will be significant, 




As Crawford and Stoker (2010) show that minorities score lower on the 
SWO Fundamentals exam at ASAT/SWOSDOC, the White variable will be the reference 
variable for both the Failure model and the HGE model.  In accordance with this study, 
the results from the present research are expected to show higher test scores for White 
officers as compared to those in other ethnic groups.   
c. Undergraduate School Quality 
The Barrons Selectivity Index classifies undergraduate institutions in one 
of five categories:  Most Competitive, Highly Competitive, Very Competitive, 
Competitive, and Least Competitive.  As shown in Bowman and Mehay (2002) and 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009), any analysis of officer performance after 
commissioning should include a variable for undergraduate school quality using the 
Barrons classification method. As Bowman and Mehay (2002) found that those graduates 
from Barrons Most Competitive institutions were most likely to exhibit a high level of 
performance in the fleet, the present study expects similar results for the SWO 
Fundamentals exam.  
d. Undergraduate Major 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) showed that an officer’s 
undergraduate major becomes significant when determining performance on the SWO 
Fundamentals exam; specifically they found that those with technical degrees 
outperformed all others. Given these results, Engineering Major is the reference variable 
for both models in the present analysis, and the expected result is that those with any 
other major will be more likely to score below 75 percent and less likely to score 85 
percent or higher on the SWO Fundamentals exam. 
e. Commissioning Source 
Crawford and Stoker (2010) suggested that USNA graduates were more 
likely to score lower on the SWO Fundamentals exam than were NROTC or OCS 
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graduates.  One possible reason for these results was that the USNA graduates were more 
anxious for the practical side of their profession and less motivated to complete academic 
work, as the previous four years had been filled with military-based training and 
schoolwork.  However, Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) concluded that USNA 
graduates should perform better than their counterparts as they had been exposed to more 
complex and demanding time-management scenarios and were more accustomed to the 
types of military rigors they would experience as Junior Officers.   
In line with Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009), and contrary to 
Crawford and Stoker (2010), this study uses USNA as the reference variable for 
commissioning source.  This decision is in part due to the reasoning Bowman, Crawford, 
and Mehay (2009) put forth regarding USNA graduates’ being accustomed to time 
management and military rigors, and in part because this study will suppose that NROTC 
graduates are equally adverse to further study and as excited for practical learning as 
USNA graduates.  Also, as discussed for the Undergraduate Major variables, and found 
in Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009), those with technical majors are more likely to 
succeed on the SWO Fundamentals exam.  As USNA has a heavy engineering core 
curriculum, USNA graduates should reasonably score higher than any non-USNA 
graduate with a non-technical degree.  
As USNA and NROTC officers are expected to experience a similar lack 
of motivation towards academic work and USNA officers are expected to be better 
trained in time-management, military demands, the rigors of study and more inclined 
towards technical subjects, it is expected that USNA officers will outperform all others.  
Therefore, this study anticipates that USNA graduates will be less likely to score less 
than 75 percent and more likely to score 85 percent or higher on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam than both NROTC and OCS graduates. 
f. Homeport 
Little Creek and Sasebo were combined, due to both ports being 
exclusively amphibious.  The expectation is that the coefficient from this variable will tell 
us the impact of being stationed in a primarily amphibious base, on an officer’s 
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performance on the SWO Fundamentals exam.  Officers serving out of Ingleside and 
Pascagoula were combined more for their specific location in the US than for mission or 
ship type.  Roy (2007) found that officers serving out of Ingleside, Pascagoula and 
Mayport were less likely to stay SWO.  As he had controlled for ship type in each port, 
he concluded that the determinant for the officers’ decisions to leave the SWO 
community was tied specifically to some unknown common factor in those three ports.  
However, in contrast to Roy (2007), this study separates Mayport in order to account for 
any variability and/or determinant from the presence of CRUDES ships and FFGs in 
Mayport.   
Norfolk is the reference variable for this group.  Bowman, Crawford, and 
Mehay (2009) state that officers who choose ships on the Atlantic coast do not perform as 
well on the SWO Fundamentals exam compared to other officers.  However, Roy (2007) 
concludes that officers out of Norfolk are more likely to stay in the Navy than any other 
officer, where officers out of Mayport, Pascagoula and Ingleside were less likely to do so.  
Due to the combination of Mayport and Norfolk by Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay 
(2009) and the combination of Mayport, Pascagoula and Ingleside by Roy (2007), and 
due to the opposing nature of the results for both studies, this study will hold Norfolk as 
the reference variable and test the impact of every other port on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam in comparison. The present study expects to find in accordance with Bowman, 
Crawford, and Mehay (2009) that officers serving in Norfolk will be less likely to score 
85 percent or above and more likely to score 75 percent or below.  
g. Ship Type 
For the present study, DDG is the reference variable for both models, as 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) found that officers assigned to DDGs were more 
likely to outperform all others.  Similarly, Bautista (1996) and Bellamy (1991) both 
found that officers on CRUDES platforms were more likely to attain SWO qualification 
earlier than their AMPHIB counterparts.  As such, the present study expects officers 
serving on DDGs to be more likely to score 85 percent or higher and less likely to score 
less than 75 percent on the SWO Fundamentals exam.  
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h. Department 
For the present study, the Combat Systems variable was chosen over 
Operations, Engineering, and Navigation/Admin as the reference variable for both 
models due to having the largest representation in the sample. 
i. Class Year 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the current SWO training program 
came into effect in August 2008.  As the average length of time between commissioning 
and ASAT for this sample is 17 months, the first class to ASAT under the INTRO/ASAT 
program arrived in January 2010.  Therefore, this model will use 2009 as the reference 
variable, in order to compare SWO Fundamentals exam scores for SWOS-at-Sea vs. 
INTRO/ASAT. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Non-linear logistic regression analysis was used to determine the influence of the 
reference and independent variables.  In order to determine which factors individually 
affect both the likelihood of a student to fail and the likelihood of a student to attain 
ASAT Honor Graduate eligibility on the SWO Fundamentals exam, this study uses two 
separate models using each scenario as a single dependent variable.  One model, using 
HGE as the dependent variable, will demonstrate the effect each variable has on a 
student’s likelihood to score an 85 percent or above; and the other, using Fail as the 
dependent variable, will demonstrate the effect each variable has on a student’s 
likelihood to score below 75 percent. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the variables chosen to analyze the relationship between an 
officer’s professional and personal background, and their potential of scoring either 
below a 75 percent or above an 85 percent on the SWO Fundamentals exam.   
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Previous chapters discussed several studies regarding SWOSDOC and ASAT 
testing as well as the current study’s variables and method of analysis. This chapter 
discusses the results of the regression analysis described in the preceding chapter to 
ascertain determinants of a student’s propensity to either fail the SWO Fundamentals 
exam by scoring below 75 percent or to attain an Honor Graduate eligible score by 
scoring 85 percent or above.  The aim of the analysis is to provide an understanding of 
the influence a newly commissioned Surface Warfare Officer’s environment and 
background have on their ability to learn and retain new information.  This chapter will 
first provide a brief overview of each model, followed by a comprehensive discussion of 
both. 
A. FAILURE REGRESSION RESULTS 
As previously discussed, this study covers data from both the current and previous 
training curricula.  Previously, the SWO Fundamentals exam was given upon a student’s 
arrival to ASAT/SWOSDOC and covered information attained during OJT and CBT.  In 
the current curriculum, the SWO Fundamentals exam measures the knowledge gained 
during the INTRO course of instruction after commissioning and through approximately 
16 months of shipboard training.  Every student is required to score a minimum of 75 
percent on the test, and is given one retake should they fail. If they fail the retake, they 
are given a course completion letter in lieu of a graduation certificate and are to be 
reassessed by their Commanding Officer and retested by their ship’s Immediate Superior 
in Command (ISIC) prior to their SWO qualification board.   
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the Failure variable is dichotomous, 
where 1 = 74 percent or below on the SWO Fundamentals exam and 0 = 75 percent or 
above.  Further, this model uses only the first attempt at taking the exam, omitting any 




ASAT. As all independent variables are also dichotomous, the results for each variable 
will be interpreted as percentage points compared with their respective reference variable.  
Table 2 provides the results of the Failure Model regression. 
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Table 2.   Failure Model Regression Results 
No Obs = 1856 
Pseudo R2 = .1265 







Gender:     
    Female .2511 .0724 .0828 .002 
Ethnicity:      
   Black .5482 .1769 .1189 .000 
   Hispanic .0697 .0195 .1584 .660 
   Asian .2065 .0609 .1423 .147 
   Native American .7566 .2624 .3892 .052 
   Other .1609 .0469 .2010 .423 
School Quality:     
   Barrons HC -.0491 -.0132 .1561 .753 
   Barrons VC -.1237 -.0327 .1529 .418 
   Barrons C .0911 .0256 .1585 .565 
   Barrons LC .4619 .1467 .1830 .012 
Undergraduate Major     
   Math/Science .1015 .0286 .1309 .438 
   Biological Science .2304 .0681 .1503 .125 
   Economics/Business .4610 .1420 .1198 .000 
   Social Sciences .4230 .1233 .1069 .000 
   Humanities .3663 .1127 .1439 .011 
   Other .2056 .0610 .3134 .512 
Commissioning Source:     
   NROTC -.0222 -.0061 .1390 .873 
   OCS -.0056 -.0015 .1669 .973 
Homeport:     
   Everett -.5492 -.1164 .2755 .046 
   Ingleside/Pascagoula -.1634 -.0417 .3139 .603 
   Little Creek/Sasebo .0437 .0122 .1477 .767 
   Mayport -.1521 -.0395 .1333 .254 
   Pearl Harbor -.1178 -.0309 .1418 .406 
   San Diego -.2525 -.0663 .0902 .005 
   Yokosuka -.1298 -.0338 .1543 .400 
Ship Type:     
   FFG .1988 .0575 .1134 .080 
   CG .0635 .0177 .1056 .548 
   AMPHIB .2502 .0721 .1047 .017 
   MCM .6286 .2107 .2772 .023 
Department:     
   Engineering .1218 .0341 .0916 .184 
   Nav/Admin .2139 .0635 .1966 .277 
   Operations .0342 .0094 .0924 .711 
Class Year:     
   2007 1.204 .4159 .1059 .000 
   2008 .4983 .1489 .0937 .000 
   2010 .5958 .1850 .0984 .000 
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As the results in Table 2 show, there are few surprises in this regression as 
compared with the results from preceding studies.  Females and Blacks continue to show 
a propensity to fail when compared to males and Whites.  Graduates from the lowest 
rated institutes are more likely to fail, than those from the highest rated institutions.  
Officers initially assigned to Amphibious ships, and MCMs, continue to have a greater 
propensity to fail than those assigned to DDGs.  Students taking the test in 2009 had 
steadily improved since 2007.  One interesting result was that students taking the exam in 
2010 were 18.5 percent more likely to fail than students in 2009. Also interesting, 
Economics/Business, Social Sciences, and Humanities majors were significantly more 
likely to fail than Engineering majors; however, Biological Sciences and Math/Science 
majors were not.  Finally of note, officers assigned to ships out of Everett and San Diego 
are about 12 percent and seven percent respectively less likely to fail than those assigned 
to ships out of Norfolk; all other ports are non-significant as compared to Norfolk.   
B. HONOR GRADUATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
As discussed in previous chapters, Honor Graduate status is given to any student 
who scores 85 percent or above on the SWO Fundamentals exam, 85 percent or above on 
the Maritime Warfare exam and 96 percent or above on the Rules of the Road exam.  As 
such, this study will use a score of 85 percent on the SWO Fundamentals exam as the 
measure for the HGE Regression, representing overall Honor Graduate eligibility. The 
HGE variable is dichotomous, where 1 = 85 percent or above on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam and 0 = 84 percent or below.  As in the Failure model, this model uses only scores 
from the student’s first attempt at taking the exam. As all independent variables are also 
dichotomous, the results for each variable will be interpreted as percentage points 
compared with its respective reference variable.  Table 3 provides the results of the 





Table 3.   Honor Graduate Eligibility Model Regression Results 
No. Obs = 1856 
Pseudo R2 = .1054 







Gender:     
   Female -.1730 -.0653 .0755 .022 
Ethnicity:     
   Black -.3396 -.1231 .1225 .006 
   Hispanic -.2366 -.0872 .1471 .108 
   Asian -.1049 -.0396 .1295 .418 
   Native American -.4908 -.1690 .4466 .272 
   Other -.3142 -.1137 .1964 .110 
School Quality:     
   Barrons HC -.1273 -.0480 .1356 .348 
   Barrons VC -.1683 -.0633 .1306 .198 
   Barrons C -.5223 -.1849 .1401 .000 
   Barrons LC -.5634 -.1934 .1733 .001 
Undergraduate Major:     
   Math/Science -.0559 -.0213 .1079 .605 
   Biological Science -.2788 -.1023 .1296 .031 
   Economics/Business -.2439 -.0907 .1037 .019 
   Social Sciences -.3811 -.1419 .0900 .000 
   Humanities -.1386 -.0521 .1265 .273 
   Other -.1967 -.0729 .2772 .478 
Commissioning Source:     
   NROTC .4097 .1573 .1211 .001 
   OCS .1477 .0572 .1437 .304 
Homeport:     
   Everett .6417 .2517 .1981 .001 
   Ingleside/Pascagoula .0201 .0077 .3107 .948 
   Little Creek/Sasebo .1479 .0575 .1472 .315 
   Mayport .3834 .1506 .1175 .001 
   Pearl Harbor .5137 .2022 .1245 .000 
   San Diego .4306 .1669 .0806 .000 
   Yokosuka .4687 .1846 .1320 .000 
Ship Type:     
   FFG -.2809 -.1040 .0976 .004 
   CG -.2488 -.0925 .0917 .007 
   AMPHIB -.2224 -.0835 .0959 .020 
   MCM -.4726 -.1644 .2704 .080 
Department:     
   Engineering -.0531 -.0203 .0806 .510 
   Nav/Admin -.1995 -.0739 .1884 .290 
   Operations -.0650 -.0248 .0807 .420 
Class Year:      
   2007 -.9679 -.3089 .1046 .000 
   2008 -.2176 -.0819 .0772 .005 
   2010 -.6313 -.2229 .0867 .000 
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As in the previous regression, we find that females and Blacks continue to show a 
propensity to underperform compared to the reference variable.  In this case, we see that 
females are about seven percent less likely to attain Honor Graduate eligibility than 
males, and Blacks are about 12 percent less likely to attain Honor Graduate eligibility 
than Whites.  Both of the lowest ranked institutions are significantly less likely to score 
an 85 percent or above than the highest ranked institution.  All other ship types are 
significantly less likely to attain Honor Graduate eligibility than DDGs.  Every other port, 
aside from Ingleside, Pascagoula, Little Creek, and Sasebo are much more likely to attain 
Honor Graduate eligibility than Norfolk.  Finally, as in the previous regression, students 
steadily progressed from 2007 to 2008, but scored lower in 2010 than in 2009.   
C. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS FOR BOTH MODELS 
1. Gender 
As can be seen from both regressions, females are underperforming on the SWO 
Fundamentals exam.  To more adequately understand these specific regression results, we 
examine the raw observed data.  Of the 478 females in the sample, 128 fail the SWO 
Fundamentals exam, giving women a 27 percent failure rate.  Of the 1443 males in the 
sample, 306 fail, giving men a 21 percent failure rate.  Thus, we see for the sample, that 
women have a six percent higher failure rate than men.  For an overall female failure rate, 
we divide the failure regression’s result of about seven percent by the sample’s failure 
rate of 23 percent and find that females are 32 percent more likely to fail the SWO 
Fundamental exam than males.   
As Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) and Crawford and Stoker (2010) 
showed similar findings for females on the SWO Fundamentals exam, it is clear that 
there is persisting influence acting upon females during the period between 
commissioning and ASAT.  As the factors influencing gender performance inequity are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, this study suggests simply that we cannot know the 




Black officers are showing a startlingly significant propensity to both fail and be 
ineligible for Honor Graduate.  Making up 10 percent of the sample, Blacks are nearly 20 
percent more likely to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam than Whites.  Given the overall 
failure rate for the sample of 23 percent and the overall HGE rate of 40 percent, Blacks 
are about 78 percent more likely to fail the exam and 31 percent less likely to attain HG 
eligibility.   
These results are indicative of a significant negative influence upon Blacks during 
the period between commissioning and ASAT.  As with gender, this study will not 
further speculate on the causal factors behind minority underperformance. 
3. School Quality 
As Bowman and Mehay (2002) showed in their analysis of officer fleet 
performance, undergraduate school quality has an impact on an officer’s output.  In this 
case, the officer who graduated from the least competitive ranked schools is about 15 
percent more likely to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam than the officer who graduated 
from the most competitive schools.  Likewise, those who graduated from the lowest two 
ranked categories are 18 percent and 19 percent respectively less likely to attain Honor 
Graduate eligibility than those who graduated from the highest ranked category.   
There are two possible reasons for this differential: those students who graduate 
from the highest ranked categories have been better prepared to learn, and are more 
receptive to new information than those from the lowest ranked categories; or, those 
students who graduate from the highest ranked institutions are intrinsically more 
motivated to learn than their counterparts from the lowest ranked institutions.  As this 
study makes no measure of motivational factors, and in fact, there are far too many varied 
influences upon a student’s motivational levels to be discussed or measured, these 
regression results should only stand to show that this differential between undergraduate 
institution categories does indeed exist. 
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4. Undergraduate Major 
These results, that Engineering majors will outperform all others, specifically the 
non-technical majors, on the SWO Fundamentals exam, are directly in line with the 
results from Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009).  For this study, Math and Science 
majors were the only majors not significantly underperforming compared with 
Engineering majors.  As with undergraduate school quality, this could be indicative of 
intelligence, motivation, or both.  As this study makes no measure of motivation, these 
results should only stand to show that the differential between engineering majors and all 
others exists.   
5. Commissioning Source 
NROTC commissioned officers are about 16 percent more likely to attain Honor 
Graduate eligibility on the SWO Fundamentals exam than USNA officers.  These results 
show that, while students from USNA are just as likely or unlikely to fail as any other 
student from another commissioning source, students from NROTC are more likely to 
excel.  One theory explaining this differential, as posed by Crawford and Stoker (2010), 
seems most likely:  USNA graduates are less motivated to undergo and complete either 
formally instructed or self-paced studies in a practical environment than their 
conventionally instructed counterparts.  Put differently, USNA students were more 
anxious to hit the deck-plates after four years of military-based training and schoolwork 
where students from civilian institutes were more capable of taking a measured approach 
to all requirements levied upon them.  However, as these regressions show no indication 
of any one commissioning source being worse than another in preparing its graduates for 
the fleet, this study suggests that these results stand only to show that the slight 
differential between USNA and NROTC for propensity to attain Honor Graduate 
eligibility exists.  
6. Homeport 
Officers stationed in Norfolk are significantly underperforming compared to their 
counterparts stationed elsewhere.  Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009) showed similar 
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results, with all officers on the Atlantic coast underperforming compared to any officer 
elsewhere.  One theory the researchers posed for the differential was that the operational 
tempo (OPTEMPO) in Norfolk could be higher than in other homeports.  While this 
study presents no conclusive data regarding OPTEMPO, it suggests that this theory does 
not appear to be supported, as other homeports, such as Yokosuka, have similar or higher 
OPTEMPOs than Norfolk.  Another theory, posed by Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay 
(2009) and Roy (2007), is that only officers graduating with the lowest Orders of Merit 
(OOM) select Norfolk, as it is seen as an “undesirable” homeport and is the last to go at 
ship selection.  As the officers underperformed in their undergraduate institution, so they 
underperformed in the fleet, with Norfolk as the common link between the two.  As with 
the previous theory, there is no conclusive data regarding homeport desirability; however, 
the OOM link does appear to have merit and warrants further study.   
7. Ship Type 
As shown in the results, officers stationed aboard Amphibious type warships and 
MCMs have a higher propensity to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam than those stationed 
aboard DDGs.  Likewise, those on DDGs are more likely to attain Honor Graduate 
eligibility than those on any other ship types.  The most likely cause of this differential is 
the difference in both experience and exposure.  All officers, regardless of ship type, are 
required to have robust knowledge of all Navy platform capabilities and limitations.  
They are expected to know and understand how each ship operates, the nature of its 
detection and targeting systems, when and how it fires its weapons and how the ship 
responds to various controls.  DDGs offer the officers exposure to each of these 
situations, providing them with the depth of understanding for the information they are 
expected to know for their SWO qualification.  To be clear, the DDG officer is expected 
to know the capabilities and limitations of all other warships as well; however, the scope 
of the qualification is much more centered on systems intrinsic to the DDG than any 
other ship type.   
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As with Homeport, another possible cause of this differential could be due to 
officers with higher OOM selecting the most “desirable” ships.  This correlation between 
college performance and self-selection onto these ships could explain the higher level of 
performance on the SWO Fundamentals exam.  However, as with Homeport, as this 
study makes no measure of college performance or ship “desirability,” this possible cause 
should serve only to inform the focus of a future study into CRUDES SWO qualification. 
This study suggests that, however impractical, the only real way to resolve the 
exam differentials between DDG and all other platforms would be to give every officer 
the same level of exposure to each ship type.  A more practical approach, which likewise 
would not completely equalize the differential, would be to increase the levels of 
exposure for all officers by allowing for ship visits, officer cruise-swaps and even 
advanced simulations.  Without such allowances for officers to gain experience with the 
type of equipment and systems found on different platforms, there will continue to be 
significant differences in levels of knowledge among ship types. 
8. Class Year 
These regressions show that students tested in 2009 outscored students in 2007, 
2008, and 2010.  August 2008 saw the shift from SWOS-at-Sea to the current 
INTRO/ASAT program, and the first students to attend ASAT following the shift arrived 
in January 2010.  With the new program came two significant changes to the officer’s 
training pipeline: the new instructor-led INTRO course in the first month of an officer’s 
first tour; and the removal of the Combat Information Center Watch Officer (CICWO) 
and Officer of the Deck Underway (OOD U/W) qualification requirements as pre-
requisites for ASAT attendance.  
CICWO and OOD U/W had previously been mandatory qualifications for all 
officers attending ASAT, which meant that the officers had to apply themselves to a 
rigorous study and practical application period during the majority of their first tour.  
They were expected to stand watches, apply themselves with their peers toward the goal 
of qualification and learn about the various shipboard systems.  These requirements could 
certainly still be enforced on ship-by-ship basis, but their relaxation for attendance to 
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ASAT means that now that the students have not been boarded for these intensive 
qualifications, they have not attained the same depth of knowledge and experience that 
their predecessors had attained.  However, without conclusive data pertaining to the 
relaxation of the qualification requirements, this study can only suggest further research 
into the effects the lack of CICWO and OOD U/W qualifications have on an officer’s 
performance on the SWO Fundamentals exam. 
The other significant change, the instructor-led INTRO course, could also 
possibly have led to the current SWO Fundamentals exam differentials.  For the first 
month of an officer’s tour aboard their first ship, they have been attending classes at their 
Fleet Concentration Area’s (FCA) Afloat Training Group (ATG).  When they return to 
work following completion of the course at the end of that month, they do so with a 
presumably basic understanding of their duties and the role they are expected to fill.  The 
potential problem arises then with their level of expectation.  The question becomes:  If I 
have already been trained, why must I continue to do the self-paced study with the 
SWOS-at-Sea v3.0 CBTs?  The expectation could be from the individual, or even from 
their chain of command, but either way, the ATG has trained them, so now they must get 
to work.  This misinterpretation and mismanagement of expectation levels could 
potentially cause the differential evidenced by these regression results.  However, as 
officers continue to cycle through the program, the new curriculum progresses and the 
fleet’s perception of the functionality of the INTRO curriculum matures, the differential 
will most likely decrease.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown the results of both model’s regressions and has theorized 
as to the cause for all differentials.  The results have largely corroborated those from 
Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009), and Crawford and Stoker (2010), and show that 
there are indeed many influences that impact an officer’s performance on the SWO 




note are the results for homeport, ship type and year.  The next chapter discusses 
overarching recommendations in detail, but most certainly further qualitative study, 
which at minimum, must be conducted in order to investigate these differentials. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding chapters have provided background insight into the nature of the 
SWO training pipeline, discussed the framework for analysis of the SWO Fundamentals 
exam, and covered the quantitative results from that analysis.  This chapter discusses 
those results as they pertain to each research question and provides recommendations for 
future studies into these and related research questions. 
A. SUMMARY 
The research questions directing the focus of this study were:   
How are a student’s pre-commissioning factors related to their SWO 
Fundamentals exam scores? 
How are a student’s professional factors related to their SWO 
Fundamentals exam scores? 
How are students in the INTRO/ASAT pipeline performing on the SWO 
Fundamentals exam compared to students from the SWOS-at-Sea 
pipeline? 
1. How Are a Student’s Pre-Commissioning Factors Related to Their 
SWO Fundamentals Exam Score? 
Gender, ethnicity, undergraduate school quality, and undergraduate major, play 
significant roles in determining a student’s performance on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam.  Females, blacks, students from the least competitive schools and those with non-
engineering degrees show a higher propensity to fail and a lower propensity to attain 
Honor Graduate eligibility. 
2. How Are a Student’s Professional Factors Related to Their SWO 
Fundamentals Exam Score? 
Homeport, ship type, and class year, play significant roles in determining a 
student’s performance on the SWO Fundamentals exam.  Officers stationed out of 
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Norfolk, those assigned to Amphibious type ships and Mine Countermeasure ships and 
those who attended ASAT in 2010 show a higher propensity to fail and a lower 
propensity to attain Honor Graduate eligibility. 
3. How Are Students in the INTRO/ASAT Pipeline Performing on the 
SWO Fundamentals Exam Compared to Students from the SWOS-at-
Sea Pipeline? 
The INTRO/ASAT pipeline started in August 2008.  Following a nominal 
timeline, the first students to attend ASAT after receiving INTRO training were those 
who arrived at ASAT in January 2010.  As shown in the results chapter, students tested in 
2010 showed a significantly higher propensity to fail the exam, and a lower propensity to 
attain Honor Graduate eligibility, than students tested in 2009. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
These results have indicated several problem areas in the SWO training pipeline.  
As the Surface Community as a whole is experiencing a wide array of negative internal 
influences, many of which discussed in VADM Balisle’s Fleet Review Panel of Surface 
Force Readiness (2010), the added strain of any inadequate training would only 
compound current and future problems.  It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that we 
fully understand the nature of these quantitative results showing deficient sub-groups in 
the SWO community and reinforce that understanding with further qualitative study. 
1. Gender and Ethnicity 
There is a performance gap for gender and ethnicity on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam; this shows that, during the period between commissioning and ASAT, there exists 
a negative influence that is manifested in exam scores.  Among many possibilities, this 
influence could exist in the exam itself, in the SWO OJT method, the SWO community at 
large or in any one of various inherent sociological factors. As such, this performance gap 
must be investigated and addressed, as it could possibly be indicative of further similar 
inequities in the SWO community. An investigation into the gender/minority 
performance gap could provide useful feedback on the Surface Community’s mentorship 
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program.  If there exists a negative influence on women and Blacks in the fleet, whether 
from males or Whites or from intrinsic sociological factors, the best and most efficient 
way to resolve such influences would be through reshaping and restructuring the nature 
and focus of the mentorship program.   
2. School Quality and Undergraduate Major 
Officers who received their undergraduate degrees from the lowest competitive 
institutions as ranked by the Barrons Selectivity Index are significantly more likely to 
underperform on the SWO Fundamentals exam than those from the most competitive. 
Likewise, those with non-engineering degrees are more likely to fail and less likely to 
attain Honor Graduate eligibility than those with engineering degrees.  This is interesting 
due to the possible influence undergraduate school quality and major could exhibit on an 
officer’s performance in other areas.  Further study into these effects could yield data 
useful for shaping future recruitment and training policies. 
3. Commissioning Source 
There were no significant differences between NROTC, OCS and USNA for 
propensity to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam. However, in the HGE model, NROTC 
showed a 16 percent propensity to score 85 percent or above on the SWO Fundamentals 
exam when compared to USNA.  Given these results, it is evident that officers 
commissioned from NROTC are at an advantage over USNA graduates during the period 
between commissioning and ASAT, as measured by the SWO Fundamentals exam.  
Further study into commissioning sources and their influence on officer fleet and 
academic performance could provide interesting results that may potentially inform the 
nature of pre-commissioning training and recruitment. 
4. Homeport and Ship Type 
Norfolk sailors appear to be severely disadvantaged compared to sailors from 
Mayport, Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, Everett and San Diego when they arrive at ASAT.  
Likewise, DDG sailors are much more likely to outperform all others on the SWO 
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Fundamentals exam. These results may be due to the types of missions the ships conduct, 
the OPTEMPO of particular fleets, the nature of quality of life on learning, or the nature 
of ship selection as related to Order of Merit (OOM).   
There have been several studies, such as Bowman, Crawford, and Mehay (2009), 
Roy (2007) and Bautista (1996), which comment on these factors.  One theory they 
mention, that Norfolk, AMPHIBs and MCMs are the “least desirable” and thus pull the 
officers with the lowest OOM, seems most likely.  As officers are “racked and stacked” 
by their commissioning sources, due to grades and military performance, and as the 
lowest ranked officers select their initial tour after the rest of their peers, if it is true that 
Norfolk and non-CRUDES ships are predominantly selected last, there could be 
significant indication tying the poor performance of Norfolk and AMPHIB/MCM sailors 
on the SWO Fundamentals exam with OOM.  The important implication here lies in the 
performance of the officers on their ships.  If it is true that in most cases only officers 
with the lowest undergraduate performance select Norfolk or non-CRUDES ships, then 
there is significant cause for concern regarding the overall professional performance of 
those officers.  The residual implications of a fleet-wide group of underperforming 
officers would be staggering.  As such, it is necessary that future research be conducted 
analyzing all aspects of an officer’s professional environment as related to performance; 
specifically, this study should focus on the nature of ship selection, and the nature of the 
relationship between selection and undergraduate performance. 
For ship-type alone, further qualitative study could reveal shortfalls or negative 
implications in the SWO training pipeline, such as the following: 
• Dedicated research may show that non-DDG officers are not seeing the 
same types of exercises and may benefit from more extensive simulator 
training.  While simulator training is not optimal when compared to real-
world training, it may prove to be the most efficient means of conveyance 
as there are many types of missions that are simply not seen by officers in 
the SWO training pipeline. 
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• It may serve to influence future cruise-swap programs, where officers are 
temporarily assigned to other deploying ships.  This would allow officers 
to miss extended inport periods on their parent ships in order to take 
advantage of varying missions and ship exercises.  This activity already 
takes place on a ship-by-ship basis; however, further study informed by 
the quantitative results from this thesis could highlight the necessity for 
fleet-wide consideration.  
5. Class Year 
Officers taking the SWO Fundamentals exam after receiving INTRO, are scoring 
significantly lower than officers who took the exam under the SWOS-at-Sea curriculum.  
This result could be stemmed from any of the following factors: 
• The relaxation of the requirement for officer completion of the 
CBT discs has removed all incentive to study the requisite material.  That 
CBT was an unpopular requirement is well known; however, if we are going 
to continue expecting that officers learn the material, it does not make sense 
to remove the requirement.  If the officers are not going to learn the material 
on their own and individual commands are not going to teach it (both 
evidenced by this thesis’ results), CBT completion should be restored as a 
requirement for SWO qualification. 
• The removal of the requirement for CICWO and OOD U/W 
qualifications as pre-requisites to ASAT have resulted in reduced level of 
knowledge upon arrival at ASAT.  Officers who have attained CICWO and 
OOD U/W have sat multiple qualification boards, stood countless underway 
watches under instruction and have pored over many publications.  It stands 
to reason then that those officers would have a broader grasp of the 
knowledge required of them upon arrival at ASAT.  This possible causal 
factor warrants further qualitative study.  Specifically, the study should focus 
on the Junior Officer’s current level of knowledge upon arrival at ASAT, 
from both the Junior Officer and Commanding Officer’s perspective.  
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• The addition of INTRO training has resulted in relaxed 
enforcement of Junior Officer shipboard training.  It is possible that officers 
who have received formal training after commissioning place less importance 
upon studying publications or reviewing CBT.  They may feel that they have 
already been trained, and so are ready to focus all of their efforts in applying 
that training.  Likewise, the Senior Officers who would have stressed the 
Junior Officer’s training may now feel that Junior Officers should focus their 
efforts on practical application rather than further study.  Any differential 
effect this possible influence may be causing will decrease over time.  As the 
impact of INTRO training becomes fully realized throughout the fleet, and 
any lacking areas in Junior Officer training are widely understood, any 
misconceptions regarding a new officer’s level of knowledge will disappear.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To better understand the results from this quantitative analysis, and to gain a 
broader understanding of the influences an officer’s background and environment have 
on professional performance, this study recommends the following: 
Conduct research studying ethnicity and gender effects on test scores.  The results 
for gender and ethnicity for both Failure and HGE models raise serious concerns about 
the SWO community’s diversity and mentorship programs.  Future qualitative research 
into these areas would prove beneficial by showing the nature and scope of any existing 
negative influences.  
Conduct research studying homeport and ship type effects on test scores.  The 
implications from this study’s negative results for Norfolk and non-CRUDES officers 
could mean that there exists a significant underperforming portion of the SWO 
community.  Identification and modification of the causal factors of this 
underperformance could significantly impact and improve the nature of the future of the 
Surface Community.    
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Conduct further studies analyzing the various leveling aspects of the 
INTRO/ASAT curriculum. This study does not measure the possible leveling effect of 
ASAT on these knowledge differentials. Further quantitative and qualitative research 
could also serve to inform the results from this thesis, specifically the differential 
between the SWOS-at-Sea and INTRO/ASAT pipelines. Currently, Bowman and 
Crawford (2011) are conducting an N1-funded study into these aspects and are analyzing 
the current curriculum in order to see what effects demographic, pre-commissioning and 
professional background have on the Navigation, Maritime Warfare and Rules of the 
Road exams in comparison with the SWO Fundamentals exam. 
Conduct a study relating performance on ASAT exams to Junior Officer 
performance.  The results of this study have shown the impact of a Junior Officer’s 
background and environment on his/her performance on the SWO Fundamentals exam.  
Using SWO qualification dates, Fitness Reports, undergraduate school grades and SAT 
scores to inform a study into the relationship between performance and ASAT exams, a 
future study would serve to fully describe the nature and effectiveness of the entire SWO 
qualification process. 
Conduct a study examining performance at Department Head School. A study 
showing the influences of an officer’s background and professional factors between 
commissioning and DH School would serve to highlight any negative or positive 
influences on an officer’s performance.  As the officers in the sample would have passed 
their initial Military Service Requirement, the results would discuss the impact the choice 
to stay in the Navy as a SWO has on performance. 
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